The impossibility of speculative trade result (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) provokes the questions why traders care about their private information, if they cannot profit from it and how the aggregate information can then be reflected in REE prices. This paper answers these questions by analyzing a speculative market as a game, which has the advantage of making the equilibrium strategies explicit. We introduce the new equilibrium selection concept of best reply resistance, which singles out those equilibria that remain an equilibrium even if opponent(s) deviate to a best reply. In the unique best reply resistant equilibrium of the two-player game trade at the REE price occurs each time both traders receive contradicting private information.
Introduction
showed that two agents sharing the same prior probability assessment about the realization of an uncertain event cannot agree to disagree after each has received additional private information. The key notion for this result is common knowledge. It is impossible that it is common knowledge among the agents that both assign different posterior probabilities to the event. Milgrom and Stokey (1982) apply this idea to a market setting, and prove the result, which is often referred to as the impossibility of speculative trade. They show that if the initial allocation is ex ante efficient, new information does not create an incentive for trade. This means that there is no transaction for which it is common knowledge that it is feasible and mutually acceptable to all participants. Milgrom and Stokey deduce this result, which is valid regardless of the market structure, in the framework of a rational expectations equilibrium (REE). Risk-averse traders prefer not to trade, whereas risk-neutral traders are indifferent between not trading and trading at the REE price. In their analysis, however, the trading strategies of the market participants sustaining these results are not made explicit. Thus, the authors conclude with the well known "disturbing questions": "Why do traders bother to gather information if they cannot profit from it? How does information come to be reflected in prices if informed traders do not trade or if they ignore their private information in making inferences? " (p. 27) .
The contribution of this paper is to answer these questions in a game theoretic framework. We study a two-sided market in which risk-neutral agents can trade a risky asset. The asset has an unknown common value that is either high or low. The agents act upon the same prior, but with diverse private information. Since no agent is endowed with the asset, the initial allocation is Pareto optimal with respect to the prior information. Thus, trade is sheer speculation based on information diversity and, hence, the Milgrom and Stokey result applies. We analyze the market as a strategic game, which we call the speculation game. The advantage of the game theoretic analysis is that it explicitly reveals the trading strategies of the players in equilibrium. This allows us to analyze the way the private information of the participants is incorporated into their strategies and to study how the aggregate information finds its way into the market.
There is a variety of models studying strategic behavior in asset markets with information diversity. The basic model by Kyle (1985) is an influential starting point of this line of research. Kyle studies a sequence of call markets with three kinds of market participants: a risk-neutral insider, who is perfectly informed of the value of the asset, a number of uninformed "noise" traders, who have no information on the asset value, and an uninformed risk-neutral market maker. Both the informed and the uninformed traders submit (price independent) quantity orders to the market maker, who then sets a single transaction price equal to the conditional expected value of the asset given the aggregate order quantity. The analysis of this model is not fully strategic in the game theoretic sense, since only the informed traders act strategically. The market maker's decision is predetermined by the exogenously specified market clearing rule and the noise traders' orders are modeled as random draws. Kyle identifies a unique equilibrium in which the information is gradually incorporated into the prices. The insider profits at the cost of the noise traders. In subsequent work this model is modified in several ways.
1 It is always assumed, however, that non-strategic noise traders exist in the market enabling the strategic players to earn positive profits. The model considered in this paper varies in two important aspects from this line of research. First, we examine a full game theoretic model of the market, in which all participants are strategic players and all market activity is endogenously 1 For example Kyle (1989) , Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) , and Foster and Viswanathan (1993) extend the Kyle (1985) model to multiple insiders. Kyle (1989) also enriches the possible order strategies from simple quantity orders to demand schedules. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) introduce two types of noise traders. The discretionary noise traders can choose the point of time when they submit their exogenously specified order. The non-discretionary noise traders are again modeled by an exogenous random draw. An excellent overview over this literature is given in the chapters 4 and 5 of O'Hara (1995) .
determined. Second, we consider an information distribution that is less polarized and more closely related to the model of Milgrom and Stokey. Each trader receives some information and no trader receives complete information. The quality of their private information makes the traders different. Although it is evident from Milgrom and Stokey that in an equilibrium of this game no player can have a strictly positive expected payoff our analysis shows that rational motives for active market participation and trade exist.
We show that the two-player speculation game has infinitely many pure strategy Nash equilibria and, as expected, both players expect a zero payoff in each of them, which either results from not participating in the market, or from participating but not trading, or from trading at the REE price. If a player considers it possible that the other player will, with at least a small probability, make a mistake, he/she has to choose an undominated equilibrium strategy. We show that the two-player speculation game has infinitely many undominated equilibria and in each of them both players participate in the market with a bid for the high signal and an ask for the low signal.
Thus, in each equilibrium as well as in each undominated equilibrium both players have infinitely many alternative best replies to the opponent's equilibrium strategy. In such a situation a player cannot exclude that the opponent will deviate from the equilibrium strategy to an alternative best reply. We introduce a new equilibrium selection criterion, which is especially customized for this kind of situations. An equilibrium is called best reply resistant if each player's equilibrium strategy is not only a best reply to the opponents' equilibrium strategies, but also to each of the alternative best replies of the opponents. By selecting a best reply resistant equilibrium a player is 'insured' against 'best reply trembles' of the opponents. The two-player speculation game has no best reply resistant equilibrium, if we consider deviations to all alternative best replies as possible. However, if we assume that a player possibly only deviates to alternative best replies which have the structure of the undominated equilibrium strategies, a unique best reply resistant equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, both players follow a very simple and conservative bidding structure: in case of the high signal, a player submits a buy offer at the lowest expected asset value that is possible under his/her private information; in case of the low signal a player submits a sell offer at the highest expected asset value that is possible given his/her private information. Every time both players received different signals they trade at the expected asset value, conditional on the aggregate information of both players, i.e., the REE price.
With these findings we are now able to precisely answer the questions posed by Milgrom and Stokey. In short: A player participates in the market, in order to exploit potential mistakes of the other player. In order to protect himself/herself against a negative expected payoff, however, the player has to consider the available information when offering. This is the way, the private information finds its way into the market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the market model and its game theoretic representation as the speculation game. In Sec. 3, the analysis of the two-player speculation game is presented. In Sec. 4, we analyze the speculation player game with N > 2 players. In Sec. 5, finally the connection of the speculation game and the no-betting result is discussed and Sec. 6 briefly concludes.
The Model
We consider a model with N ≥ 2 players, named 1, . . . , N. No player has an endowment. The risky asset A has a common value V to all players. It can either be high, i.e., V = H, or it can be low, i.e., V = L. We assume that H > L ≥ 0 and that both realizations of the asset value occur equally likely, i.e.,
No player is fully informed about the asset value V . Instead, each player i privately receives a signal s i ∈ Γ, which is drawn independently from the other players' signals. Player i has a signal reliability of p i , which means that i's signal reflects the true value with probability p i , i.e.,
We assume that no player knows V with certainty and each player is more likely to receive the correct than the incorrect signal, i.e., 1/2 < p i < 1. Furthermore, we assume that each player has a different signal reliability, i.e., p i = p j for i = j. Finally, without loss of generality, we sort the players by the decreasing order of their signal reliability, i.e., p 1 > · · · > p N . Each player knows his/her own signal reliability and the distribution of the signal reliabilities. The players, however, are not aware of the identities of the players with the other signal reliabilities.
Let Σ = {σ = (s 1 , . . . , s N )|s i ∈ Γ} be the set of all signal profiles of the N players. Obviously, Σ = Γ N . A state of the world ω is characterized by the payoff relevant realization v of the asset value V and the signal profile σ which is payoff irrelevant, but correlated to V . Thus, Ω = Γ × Σ is the set of the possible states of the world. Each player i can partition Σ into two information partitions Σ i (H) and Σ i (L). The partition Σ i (v) = {σ ∈ Σ|s i = v} is the set of all signal profiles, which are possible after player i received the private signal s i = v ∈ Γ. The intersection of all players' information partitions Σ i (v) is a singleton, namely the true signal profile. All players have common prior probability assessments on the states of the world, but have different posteriors after receiving their signals. Since each players' signal reliability is greater than one half, the posteriors represent truly better information on the realized state than the prior information.
The N players can choose whether or not to participate in a two-sided clearinghouse market. Non-participation results in a zero profit. On the market each player can buy or sell (short) at most one unit of A. Since the players are neither endowed with assets nor with cash, each players' total profit is his/her trade profit. A seller's net gain of trade is equal to the trade price minus the value of the asset and a buyer's net gain of trade is equal to the value of the asset minus the paid trade price. Evidently, in this market Milgrom and Stokey's impossibility of speculative trade result holds.
The speculation game
The described situation can be modeled as an N -person zero-sum strategic game, which we call the speculation game. Due to the simultaneous offers to the clearinghouse market, the modeling of a strategic game is at hand. Profits can only be made by buying the asset or by selling it short. However, since the asset has a common value to all players, the gain of one trader is always balanced by the loss of another trader. Therefore, the game is zero-sum.
A pure strategy τ i of player i is of the form 
After all players simultaneously choose one of their strategies, the asset price is determined in a clearinghouse market. All submitted bids are sorted from the highest to the lowest limit price, and all submitted asks are sorted from the lowest to the highest limit price. In the usual way, the demand function is constructed from the bids and the supply function is constructed from the asks. Only if these two functions intersect a market clearing price exists. In that case the market clearing price is the midpoint of the intersection of the demand and the supply curve. All players who had bid this or a greater price are potential buyers and all players who had asked this or a smaller price are potential sellers. If the number of potential buyers equals the number of potential sellers, all of them trade. Otherwise, the market side with an excess is rationed by a random assignment of the potential traders to be the actual traders.
The payoff of a player who does not trade is zero. If trade occurs at price x and the asset value is v ∈ {H, L}, the buyer has an ex post payoff of v −x and the seller's ex post payoff is x − v. Since the realization v of V is unknown to the players, they form expectations about their payoffs conditional on the best available information, namely the signal profiles. Thus, if trade occurs at price x in the signal profile σ, the buyer has an expected payoff of E(V |σ) − x and the seller has an expected payoff of x − E(V |σ).
We assume that the players are risk neutral. Furthermore we assume, that each player's utility function is normalized so that the utility is zero, if the player does not participate in the market or does not trade. Thus, according to Milgrom and Stokey players are indifferent between trading at zero expected profit and not trading at all. We finally assume that the players' utilities are separable and monotonically increasing in money. Together with risk neutrality, this ensures that the players will maximize their utility by simply maximizing the expected gains of trading in the asset market.
Obviously, in a Nash equilibrium of the speculation game each player has to expect a non-negative payoff for both possible signals. Otherwise, a player could unilaterally replace the strategy component(s) with the negative expected payoff by (nop, 0) to avoid the negative payoff. Since the game is zero-sum, a necessary condition for a Nash equilibrium of the speculation game is that each player expects a zero payoff for both possible signals.
The Two-Player Speculation Game
Consider a two-player speculation game with the well informed player 1 and less informed player 2, with p 1 > p 2 . This game has the four possible signal profiles σ HH , σ HL , σ LH , and σ LL . In this notation, the first index component denotes the signal of player 1 and the second index component refers to the signal of player 2. Player 1 has the two information partitions Σ 1 (H) = {σ HH , σ HL } and Σ 1 (L) = {σ LH , σ LL }, and player 2 has the information partitions Σ 2 (H) = {σ HH , σ LH } and Σ 2 (L) = {σ HL , σ LL }. Due to the inequality of the players' signal reliabilities, the expected asset values conditional on the four signal profiles are in a strict order:
For several strategy components of the two-player speculation game there is no trade. These are situations in which either one or both players do not participate in the market, or when both players submit an ask or both players submit a bid, or when one ask and one bid exists, but the bid limit is below the ask limit. Only in case one player submits a bid and one player submits an ask and the bid limit is equal to or greater than the ask limit, the clearinghouse price is the average of the ask and the bid limit.
For technical reasons we introduce the following notation. Let τ v i be a strategy component of player i ∈ {1, 2} for signal v ∈ {H, L} which specifies a market participation, i.e., does not choose (nop, 0). A deviation τ from τ v i is called a deviation to a less competitive strategy component if both τ v i and τ specify a bid (ask), but the deviation τ specifies a lower (higher) limit price.
The boundary strategies
Let m i = min{E(V |σ)|σ ∈ Σ i (H)} be the lowest expected asset value conditional on player i's information partition Σ i (H) and M i = max {E(V |σ)|σ ∈ Σ i (L)} be the highest expected asset value conditional on player i's information partition Σ i (L). Explicitly, m 1 = E HL , m 2 = E LH , M 1 = E LH , and M 2 = E HL . We call m i the bid boundary and M i the ask boundary of player i. A player who received signal H and bids the bid boundary never achieves an expected loss by buying the asset, since the price limit is the lowest possible asset value conditional on the player's information partition. Similarly, a player who received signal L and submits an ask at the ask boundary is certain achieves an expected loss by selling the asset. The pure strategy τ * i = ((bid , m i ), (ask , M i )) is called the boundary strategy and (bid , m i ) and (ask , M i ) are called the boundary strategy components of player i. Finally, we call the strategy profile, where both players play their boundary strategy, i.e., (τ *
Under the boundary strategy profile τ * trade takes place each time both players receive different signals on the asset value. In the signal profile σ HL player 1 buys the asset from player 2 at the price E HL and in σ LH player 2 buys the asset from player 1 at the price E LH . Thus, in both cases the player with the high signal buys the asset from the player with the low signal at the expected asset value conditional on the signal profile. Hence, both players achieve an expected payoff of zero from every trade. In the signal profiles σ LL and σ HH the two players do not trade, because they either both bid or both ask, respectively.
The maximin strategies
Obviously, both player's maximin payoff, i.e., the highest expected payoff a player can ensure himself/herself regardless of the opponent's strategy choice, is zero. However, for every signal, both players have an infinite number of maximin strategy components yielding to the maximin payoff. These are the boundary strategy component, the less competitive deviations from the boundary strategy component, the bid at the lowest possible limit price E LL , the ask at the highest possible limit price E HH , and the non-participation, as described in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The set of player 1's pure maximin-strategy components is
The set of player 2's pure maximin-strategy components is
The proof immediately follows from the fact that each of the listed strategy components results in an expected payoff of at least zero and that no other strategy component secures an expected payoff of zero. Both, a bid for more than the minimal possible asset value and an ask for less than the maximal expected asset value may result in a negative expected payoff.
A two-person zero-sum game in which both player's maximin payoffs add to zero is called specially strictly determined (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) . In such a game, the pure strategy Nash equilibria (saddle points) coincide with the strategy profiles of the maximin strategies. Hence, Theorem 1 immediately follows.
Theorem 1.
A strategy profile (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is a pure strategy equilibrium of the twoplayer speculation game if and only if it consists of maximin strategies, i.e.,
Trade in equilibrium
In particular, Theorem 1 shows that the boundary strategy profile τ * is an equilibrium, which we call the boundary equilibrium. It is the only equilibrium in which trade takes place each time both players received different signals. More generally, in an equilibrium of the two-player speculation game, trade can only occur under the boundary strategy components. The trade price always equals the expected asset value conditional on the signal profile, i.e., the REE price and, needless to repeat, both players expect a payoff of zero from each trade.
Undominated equilibria
Among both players' equilibrium strategies there are some which are weakly dominated by others. If a player considers it possible that the other player will, with at least a small probability, make a mistake, he/she has to choose an undominated strategy 2 since they exploit possible mistakes of the opponent best. Theorem 2 shows that both players still have infinitely many undominated equilibrium strategies. Proof. The strategy components (nop, 0), (ask, E HH ), and (bid, E LL ) result in a zero expected payoff, regardless of the other player's strategy. As maximin strategy components (bid, m i ) and (ask, M i ) never result in a negative expected payoff, however, for several of the opponent's strategy components they result in a positive expected payoff.
Theorem 2.
3 The undominated equilibria (τ 1 , τ 2 ) of the two-person speculation game are of the form
Hence, in an undominated equilibrium of the two-player speculation game each player submits his/her boundary strategy component or a less competitive deviation from it. In particular, each player submits a bid in case of the high signal and submits an ask for the low signal. We call a strategy of this structure a speculation strategy.
Best reply resistant equilibria
Theorems 1 and 2 show that in each pure strategy equilibrium as well as in each undominated equilibrium of the two-player speculation game each player has an infinite number of alternative best replies. Hence, a player cannot exclude that the opponent will deviate from the equilibrium strategy to one of the alternative best replies. For this kind of situations we introduce a new equilibrium selection concept, which selects those equilibria that are robust with respect to 'best reply trembles'. We call an equilibrium best reply resistant if each player's equilibrium strategy is not only a best reply to the opponent's equilibrium strategy but also to each of the opponent's alternative best replies. Thus, in a best reply resistant equilibrium, each player is sure to always play a best reply, no matter which best reply is chosen by the opponent. Definition 1. Let τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 ) be a pure strategy equilibrium of a two-player game and let BR i (τ j ) be the set of player i's pure best replies to the opponent's equilibrium strategy τ j , for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j. The equilibrium τ is called resistant against deviations to alternative best replies (shortly: best reply resistant), if (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is an equilibrium for every τ 2 ∈ BR 2 (τ 1 ) and (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is an equilibrium for every τ 1 ∈ BR 1 (τ 2 ).
Obviously, every strict Nash equilibrium is best reply resistant.
Example 1.
Player 2 In relation to the established solution concepts best reply resistance is closest to sets closed under rational behavior (curb sets) by Basu and Weibull (1991) . The crucial difference, however, is that Basu and Weibull select sets of strategy profiles that contain all their best replies, while the concept of best reply resistance selects among Nash equilibria. The following example, which is Basu and Weibull's example 2c, demonstrates the difference.
Example 2.
Player 2 L R T 1,1 1,0 Player 1 B 1,0 0,0 This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria (T, L) and (B, L). The first is best reply resistant, while the latter is not. The set {T} × {L} is not curb, since player 1 has the alternative best reply B, which is not an element of 1's set. However, under the assumption that the players are cautious in the sense of never playing a weakly dominated strategy, the set {T}×{L} fulfills the less restrictive concept of being closed under rational and cautious behavior (curb*). Hence, Basu and Weibull also select the equilibrium (T, L) if they assume away the possibility that player 1 deviates to the weakly dominated alternative best reply B. For (T, L) to be best reply resistant, in contrast, it is important that the players still play an equilibrium of the game, even if player 1 deviates to B.
In both of the above examples best reply resistance selects among the pure strategy Nash equilibria. However, one can easily construct situations -and the two-player speculation game is one of them -in which no best reply resistant equilibrium exists. In these situations the requirement that the equilibrium strategy has to be a best reply to all alternative best replies of the opponent is too restrictive. However, it sometimes seems reasonable to weaken the concept and, instead of allowing resistance to deviations to arbitrary alternative best replies, narrow down the class of strategies where the alternative best replies are assumed to be chosen from. If we assume that a player possibly only deviates to alternative best replies in speculation strategies, the boundary equilibrium is the unique best reply resistant equilibrium of the two-player speculation game.
Theorem 3. The boundary equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the two-player speculation game which is best reply resistant against deviations to speculation strategies.
Proof. First note that the boundary equilibrium τ * is a best reply resistant equilibrium against deviations to best replies in speculation strategies. The reason for this is that in the boundary equilibrium the alternative best replies in speculation strategies are exactly the undominated equilibrium strategies (see Lemma 1). In order to show that the boundary equilibrium is the unique equilibrium, which is best reply resistant against deviations to speculation strategies, we show that in each equilibrium, which differs in at least one strategy component from the boundary equilibrium, the alternative best replies in speculation strategies are not all maximin strategy components. Consider the equilibrium (((bid , β), (ask , E LH )), ((bid , E LH ), (ask , E HL ))), with β < E HL , which differs in one strategy component from the boundary equilibrium. This equilibrium is not best reply resistant. An alternative best reply of player 2 in speculation strategies would be to choose τ L 2 = (ask, β + ∈) with β + ∈ < E HL , which is not a maximin strategy component. With this alternative best reply there would still be no trade in the signal profile σ HL and thus both players would have a zero expected payoff. However, if player 2 chooses this best reply, the strategy component τ H 1 = (bid, β) is no longer part of a best reply of player 1. The best reply component of player 1 for signal H is τ H 1 = (bid, β + ∈). Then the two players trade in σ HL at price β + ∈ < E HL and the buyer 1 achieves a strictly positive expected payoff. With similar arguments one can show that each equilibrium, that differs from the boundary equilibrium in at least one of the strategy components is not a best reply resistant equilibrium.
The N-Player Speculation Game
In this section we relax the assumption that the game is played by only two players and analyze the speculation game with N > 2 players. However, unlike in the two-player case we will not determine all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the N -player speculation game. Obviously, there are numerous equilibria in which trade does not take place. Since our main interest is in studying how the private information is incorporated into market prices, we concentrate on the questions, whether there can be trade in an equilibrium of an N -player speculation game and if so, at which prices.
Bilateral trade in equilibrium
We first focus on equilibria of the N -player speculation game in which only two players trade. In Theorem 4 we establish that an equilibrium exists in which only the two best informed players trade at prices equal to the equilibrium trade prices of the two-player game of these players. Theorem 5 asserts that, if only two players trade in equilibrium while all the other players do not participate, then the traders must be the two best informed players.
To state the theorems we need some notation. Recall that we numbered the players such that the signal reliability decreases with an increasing player number, i.e., p 1 > · · · > p N . For two different players i and j denote with E ij IJ the expected asset value conditional on player i receiving signal I ∈ {H, L} and player j receiving signal J ∈ {H, L} in the two-player speculation game of the players i and j, i.e., E Proof. According to Lemma 4 (in the Appendix) the strategy profile τ satisfies the necessary equilibrium requirement that all players expect a zero payoff from each of their strategy components. In order to show that this strategy profile is an equilibrium of the speculation game, we show that neither of the participating players 1 and 2, nor the non-participating players 3, . . . , N can profitably deviate. Under τ the participating players are in a situation comparable to a two-player speculation game. Since the strategy profile (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is an equilibrium of the twoplayer game, neither player 1 nor player 2 has an incentive to unilaterally deviate.
Hence, it remains to show that the non-participating players 3 ≤ k ≤ N cannot gain by unilaterally deviating to a participation strategy. In order to simplify the notations, however without loss of generality, we consider the case N = 3 and show that player 3 cannot profitably deviate from the non-participation. We use the following notations: σ 123 IJK denotes the signal profile of the three-player speculation game in which player 1 receives signal I, player 2 receives signal J, and player 3 receives signal K, and E
123
IJK denotes the expected asset value in that signal profile,
Evidently, player 3 can expect a gain only from trading. One way of deviating to a participation strategy component is that player 3 matches at least one of the strategy components of player 1 or player 2. This means player 3 specifies a bid in trade every time they have diverging signals, the equilibrium strategies have to be
we know that such an equilibrium exists with i = 1 and j = 2. Now we show that the equilibrium property of τ implies that i = 1 and j = 2. Without loss of generality, we again assume that N = 3.
Suppose that i = 2 and j = 3. Assume that if player 2 has the signal H and player 3 has the signal L, i.e., the signal profiles σ 
12
LH the seller player 1 makes an expected gain at the cost of player 2. If, however, player 1 can achieve a strictly positive expected payoff, the strategy profile τ cannot be an equilibrium. With similar arguments one can show that in the case i = 1 and j = 3 the better informed player 2 can profitably exploit the trade situation of player 1 and player 3, he is not involved in.
The maximin-strategies
In the two-player speculation game the equilibrium strategies are exactly the maximin strategies of the players. In a speculation game with more than two players this is not the case. The players do not necessarily have to play maximin strategies in an equilibrium and actually in the equilibrium described in Theorem 4 players 1 and 2 do not submit maximin strategies.
As in the two-player speculation game let m i = min{E(V |σ)|σ ∈ i (H)} denote the lowest expected asset value conditional on player i's information partition i (H) (the bid boundary) and M i = max {E(V |σ)|σ i ∈ (L)} denote the highest expected asset value conditional on player i's information partition i (L) (the ask boundary). Then, each of the N players has an infinite number of maximin strategy components for every signal, namely the boundary strategy component, the less competitive deviations from the boundary strategy component, the bid at the lowest possible asset value η = E(V |s 1 = · · · = s N = L), the ask at the highest possible asset valueη = E(V |s 1 = · · · = s N = H), and the non-participation. Obviously, each of the maximin strategies guarantees an expected payoff of at least zero.
Lemma 5. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ N be a player of the N -player speculation game. Then the set of player i's pure maximin-strategy components is
From Lemma 5 it is obvious that in a game of more than two players all equilibria in maximin-strategies are no-trade equilibria. Nevertheless, in each equilibrium, each player is indifferent between submitting the equilibrium strategy and one of his/her infinitely many maximin strategies. Hence, a player cannot exclude that one or more of the other players deviate to maximin strategies. Therefore, we focus on those equilibria which are resistant against deviations to maximin strategies.
Best reply resistant equilibria with trade
Definition 1 can be directly transferred to an N player game by calling an equilibrium τ best reply resistant, if each strategy profile τ , that differs from τ only in the respect that the strategies of an arbitrary number of players are replaced by arbitrary alternative best replies of these players, is also an equilibrium. As in the two-player case, a best reply resistant equilibrium does not exist in the Nplayer speculation game. If we, however, consider only equilibria which are resistant against deviations to best replies in maximin strategies 4 , we can show that in such an equilibrium of the N -player speculation game, trade can only take place between the two best informed players and that the trade prices are equal to the equilibrium trade prices of the two-player speculation game of these two players. In particular this shows that trade does not occur at the REE price of the N -player game.
Theorem 6.
(1) In an equilibrium of the N-player speculation game which is resistant against deviations to maximin strategies, trade can only take place between players 1 and 2. (2) The equilibrium described in Theorem 4 is best reply resistant against deviations to maximin strategies.
Proof.
(1) Suppose τ is an equilibrium of the speculation game in which trade takes place for at least one signal profile. The strategy profile τ is best reply resistant against deviations to maximin strategies if it remains an equilibrium after one or more players deviated to an arbitrary maximin strategy. In particular this means that the strategy profile τ in which all but two players, that are involved in trade, deviated to the non-participation strategy, is an equilibrium. From Theorem 5 we know that in an equilibrium in which only two players participate in the market and in which trade takes place, the two participating players have to be the players 1 and 2. Thus, a necessary condition for a best reply resistant equilibrium against deviations to maximin strategies is that trade can only take place between the players 1 and 2. (2) Consider the equilibrium τ described in Theorem 4. Suppose τ is a strategy profile that differs from τ by one or more players deviating to a maximin strategy. This means that these players deviate to a strategy that guarantees at least zero for themselves and are therefore protected against exploitation. However, a player who does not play a maximin-strategy in τ , may now, due to the deviation of the other players, achieve a negative expected payoff. This is the only reason why τ might not be an equilibrium. Therefore τ obviously is an equilibrium if one or more of the non-participating players deviate to a maximin strategy and/or if both of the participating players deviate to a maximin strategy. Thus, the most interesting case is that player i ∈ {1, 2} deviates to a maximin strategy and player j ∈ {1, 2} with j = i, stays with his/her equilibrium strategy. Then player j is the only player who does not play a maximin strategy and might therefore be a subject for exploitation. Specifically, one of the players k ≥ 3 could take the opportunity and trade with j. However, as shown in the proof of Theorem 4 player k expects a loss when trading with player j who submits τ j . Thus, the equilibrium described in Theorem 4 is best reply resistant against deviations to maximin strategies.
The Speculation Game and the No-Betting Result
There is a strong analogy between the impossibility of speculative trade and the no betting result by Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983) . They show that two players with the same priors, but with different posteriors, will refuse any zero-sum bet which is proposed to them. The key assumption is that the information partitions of the players are common knowledge. In an iterative process of announcements of the willingness to bet, which precedes the betting, each player will infer additional information from the other player's willingness to bet. This process eventually converges to a state where both players refuse to bet. 5 The two-player speculation game can be interpreted as a zero-sum betting. The main difference to previously studied betting situations is that the 'bets' in the speculation game are endogenously created by the bettors. The bettor specifies the prize of the bet and whether he/she wants to offer (ask) or to take (bid) the bet. Thus, two agents who are interested in betting, are not restricted to the binary choices of saying 'yes' or 'no' to an exogenously pre-specified bet. In the following we will argue that enriching the bettors' strategy sets by formulating the betting problem as a speculation game is advantageous both for the strategic as well as for the behavioral analysis.
Let us first focus on the consequences for the strategic analysis. The no-betting result by Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983) is sustained by the convergence of the iterative process in which the players announce their willingness to bet. This process can either take place "in the heads of the agents" or it can be carried out by iteratively exchanging statements. In the latter case it is assumed that the bettors report their willingness to bet truthfully. This, however, raises the question whether a bettor has an incentive to report truthfully or whether he/she can achieve a unilateral advantage by a strategic manipulation.
6 The latter would be a severe problem for the iterative process. In the "betting market" this iterative process is not needed. It is replaced by a procedure where the bettors name the bets they are willing to accept. The Nash equilibria describe the profiles of bets, where no advantageous strategic manipulations exist. Besides this strategic problem of the iterative process, there is a behavioral aspect to it. From the experimental work by Nagel (1998) we know that subjects follow an iterated reasoning process only to a very limited extend. In Nagel's beauty contest experiment every participant has to state a number between 0 and 100. The participant who stated the number closest to two thirds of the average of all stated numbers is the winner. By iterative reasoning a player can conclude that the number zero is the best choice. However, in the evaluation of the comments the subjects provided for their choices, Nagel observes that the process of iterated reasoning mostly is, if found at all, not followed consequently to its end. But, this casts doubt on the capability of subjects in the betting game to perform the iterative process, which should guide them to the no betting result. Indeed, Sonsino, Erev and Gilat (2002) found in an experimental betting game that, even after 200 repetitions of the game, the individual betting rate was still over 60%. There are two reasons why one might hypothesize that the no betting result has better chances to be reached in an experiment involving the market environment than in the conventional betting situation. First of all, there are equilibrium strategies, namely the boundary strategies, which have a simple and quite intuitive structure. Second, in a betting market, the subjects do not have to learn to refrain from acting, but can instead actively submit asks and bids. However, this hypothesis still has to be tested in a laboratory experiment.
Conclusion
The paper provides a game theoretic analysis of a speculative asset market with information diversity, as described by Milgrom and Stokey (1982) . For the twoplayer speculation game we derive a game theoretic confirmation of the findings of Milgrom and Stokey: risk-neutral traders expect an equilibrium payoff of zero, which either results from not trading or from trading at the REE price.
7 The game theoretic analysis has the advantage that -by making the players' equilibrium strategies explicit -the questions posed by Milgrom and Stokey can be answered as follows. If a player considers it possible that the other player makes a mistake with some small probability, he/she will participate in the market, in order to exploit potential mistakes of the other player. However, in order to be protected against a negative expected payoff, the player has to consider the available information.
The market offer of a player not only has to take the own private information into account, but also all possible instances of private information of the other player. Through this way, the private information finds its way into the market. By submitting the boundary strategy each player additionally achieves protection against deviations of the other player to alternative best replies. Then, each time both players have contradicting private information, trade occurs in equilibrium at the REE price. Notice, however, that this price is unknown to each individual trader. It is "revealed in the market" as the trade price, since it is a bound for profitable trade for both traders, given the private information.
In an equilibrium of the N-player speculation game which is resistant to deviations to maximin strategies, trade can only take place between the two best informed players. The trade prices are not the REE prices of the N-player game, but the equilibrium trade prices of the two-player game of these two players. Hence, the two best informed players completely ignore the information of the less informed players and act as if they were in a two-player game. The less informed players cannot transfer their information to the market, since every trade offer of a less informed player can be exploited by one of the two best informed players.
J ∈ {H, L}, these two players trade with each other. Then both players expect a zero payoff from these trades if and only if the trade price is E ij

IJ .
Proof. In order to show how the expected asset values of the two-player game are connected to the N -player game, we present some easy calculations. Let Σ ij (IJ ) = {σ ∈ Σ|s i = I, s j = J} be the set of all signal profiles σ ∈ Σ of the N-player game in which player i received signal I and player j received signal J. Then 
Suppose, that i and j trade the asset at price x every time i receives signal I and j receives signal J. Then the buyer's expected payoff from these trades is σ∈Σij (IJ ) P (σ) · [E(V |σ) − x] = σ∈Σij (IJ ) P (σ) · E(V |σ) − σ∈Σij (IJ ) P (σ) · x. From the above calculations, it is immediately obvious that the buyer's expected payoff is zero if and only if x = E ij IJ . Naturally, the seller then also expects a zero payoff from these trades.
